


Mount Saint Vincent University (MSVU)

# THE PEPS GAZETTE



NOVEMBER 2024

## **FOREWORD**

I wanted to continue the established tradition for the Mount Saint Vincent University of publishing a Gazette, that will review not only popular socio-political and economic news but also little-known trends at the university, city, provincial, regional, national, and global levels. Our goal is to make The Gazette an interesting and instructive resource on topics that are poorly covered by large mainstream media. We will be happy to receive any feedback and take part in discussions on relevant topics.

This is our first Gazette in 2024! However, the following materials are already under development!

Daniil Zhelezniak, Vice President of PEPS MSVU.

### **An upcoming event:**

Experience the thrill of the United States Election Night at Mount Saint Vincent University, organized by the PECS student community! Join us on Tuesday, November 5, from 7 PM to 12 AM at the Rook Café and Pub for live coverage, insightful commentary, and interactive discussions as the results come in. Enjoy a night of refreshments, and real-time updates on this pivotal moment in US politics, that can influence the socio-political and economic architecture not only of North America but also of the whole world. Whether you're a political enthusiast or just curious about the process, this event promises an engaging and memorable experience. Don't miss out—be part of the excitement!



# THE TOPIC OF INTERNATIONAL NEWS

## **The War in the Caucasus**

**Written by Daniil Zhelezniak**



### **Introduction**

In recent years, conflicts between countries have been growing more and more, including old interstate tensions that are being reactivated. Vivid examples of this can be the Russo-Ukrainian war that began in February 2022 or the war between Israel and Palestine, the active phase of which intensified in October 2023 after many years of relative calm.

However, there are conflicts that do not receive such fame as the wars I mentioned due to various reasons. One such example is the Caucasus region, where hostilities are

periodically intensified, despite all attempts to freeze them. Such events took place in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan quite recently, and it is about them that I would like to tell in detail, while, as in my previous story about events in the Middle East, I will not take sides.

## **What is Karabakh: the origins of the conflict?**



To understand the essence of the conflict, we will have to delve into the history of Nagorno-Karabakh, which by the way Armenians call Artsakh, and Azerbaijanis call just Qarabag. This beautiful region is located in the heart of the Caucasus mountains between Iran, Azerbaijan and Armenia, has an area of approximately 3,170 km<sup>2</sup>, while not having access to the seas, large rivers, or lakes (“Nagorno-Karabakh profile”, 2023). These lands are de jure part of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which is recognized by all countries of the

world, including the Republic of Armenia. But most of the total population, which according to the latest data was almost 120,000, are ethnic Armenians living de facto on the territory of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (Republic of Artsakh). Karabakh has a long history going back to pre-Christian times, for a long time it has been part of the state of Greater Armenia, which is why many believe that Armenians are the indigenous inhabitants of this area. Throughout history, there has been a constant struggle between different nations, including wars, genocides, and resettlement. If Armenians are mostly parishioners of the Armenian Apostolic Church, a branch of Christianity, by the way, the first in the world to establish this Christian religion at the official level, while Azerbaijanis are a Turkic people speaking a very similar language to Turkish, and are mostly Shiite Muslims, although not as religious as their southern neighbors, in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Turkic peoples came to the territory of the Caucasus from the steppes of Central Asia (modern Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) in the 11th century, and in the 13th century, they became the dominant force. After that, the Armenians fall into a kind of slavery with the Turks (Adalian, 1996). With the arrival of the Russian Empire on these lands in the 19th century, interethnic conflicts almost stopped, but after a few decades, nationalist movements began to grow among both Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and often it came to serious pogroms on both sides. Tensions also continued in the 20th century, both under the rule of the Russian Empire and after the socialist revolution of 1917. It is also important to mention that the relations between the Armenians and the Turkic peoples were strongly influenced by the forced Islamization and the infamous genocide organized by the Ottoman Empire against the Armenian people (1915-1917).

The modern history of Karabakh began with the collapse of the USSR and the independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan, after which the bloody first Karabakh war immediately began, which ended only in 1994 with the victory of the Armenian side. Since Nagorno-Karabakh was part of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was important for the Azerbaijani side to maintain control over this zone, even despite the Armenian majority among the population. As a result of this conflict, about 30,000 people were killed, hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Azerbaijanis became refugees, and the region de facto, but not de jure, became part of the Republic of Armenia (Uhlig, 1993). After that, a relative lull with low-intensity fighting continued for almost 30 years. However, in September 2020, full-scale hostilities began between the Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces with the use of all types of troops (artillery, heavy military equipment, aviation) (“The 44-day Patriotic War (II Karabakh War)”, 2020). Both sides blamed each other for the motives of the beginning of these clashes. The tragic events called the Second Karabakh War lasted a month and a half and, unlike the first, ended with the victory of the Azerbaijani side, which led to political instability in Armenia. Also, according to the results of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement signed by the leaders of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, and the Russian Federation, about 2,000 Russian military personnel were sent to the Caucasus as peacekeepers primarily to protect transport and humanitarian corridors (“Document: Full text of the agreement between the leaders of Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan”, 2020).

## **Current geopolitical situation in the region**

I would like to start the story about the current state of the conflict from the geopolitical context. First of all, you need to understand that Armenia is a collective security treaty organization, a military alliance comprising 6 post-Soviet states, including Russia, which have their own interests in the Caucasus region. However, as we already know, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is not legally part of the Armenian state, accordingly, all the treaties on the territory apply to this territory with the status of a “gray zone”. At the beginning of 2023, Russia and Armenia had very warm and stable relations in all spheres, including economic and military. For example, the share of the Russian Federation occupies 34% of imports and 24% of exports for the Armenian Republic, although, after 2023, Armenia is working on diversifying partnerships (“Where does Armenia import from? (2021)”, 2021). Besides, the Armenian economy is heavily dependent on money transfers by citizens of their country, which recently exceeded 10% of GDP, despite the fact that most of these money transfers came from the Russian Federation (Berikyan, 2022). Russia and Armenia are also connected by a centuries-old history of life within the same jurisdiction and similarity in religion. In addition, there is a huge Armenian diaspora in Russia, numbering about 3 million people, among whom there are oligarchs who exert various kinds of influence on some aspects of the Russian political course (Ziener, 2009).

Russia also has good friendly relations with the Azerbaijani side, taking 19% of last year's imports according to statistics, higher than any other country (“Foreign trade partners of Azerbaijan”, 2022). But at the same time, Azerbaijan does not belong to any



military blocs, but has deep cooperation, including in the military sector, with Turkey.

The Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan are best friends due to objective demographic and historical factors, since both peoples are representatives of Turkic

nations professing the same religion and traditions and speaking very similar languages.

In general, Azerbaijan can be described as a petrostate dependent on natural resources,

and quite authoritarian, because for 30 years the power in the country has been in the

hands of one family, first Heydar Aliyev, and since 2003 his son Ilham Aliyev

(“Azerbaijan 2021”, 2021). Azerbaijan is also a more prosperous nation, surpassing the

more democratic Armenia not only in GDP per capita, but also in total nominal by several

times, which certainly helps to create a difference in the material and technical equipment

of the army.

Other key players in the region are the Islamic Republic of Iran and Western countries.

Iran, having borders with both Karabakh states, supports the Armenians at the diplomatic

level, despite the fact that Azerbaijan is closer to them in religious terms. The reason for

this is the concern of the Iranian leadership about potential separatist movements in the

north of the country, where the majority of the population are ethnic Azerbaijanis.

According to statistics, about 15 million people of Azerbaijani origin live in Iran, which

is more than in Azerbaijan itself (Swietochowski & Collins, 1999). The countries of the

European Union are trying to remain neutral, but pro-Armenian voices are increasingly

being heard, including under the influence of various lobbying groups, in particular in the

United States and France, where a large Armenian diaspora lives. Armenia and NATO,

despite the discontent of the Russian side and the presence of a military base of the armed forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Armenia, continue to strengthen relations, which even reached joint US-Armenian military exercises (Demourian, 2023). Moreover, the government of the Armenian Republic, including the Prime Minister, has already sought to reduce military ties with Russia, which significantly changes the balance of power and the geo-political situation in the region (Gavin, 2024).

### **The Tragedy of 2023**

The key events of the previous year began on September 19, when Azerbaijani forces conducted a military operation on the territory of Karabakh, which actually led to the closure of this issue and lasted only a day. Already at noon on September 20, the Baku authorities announced the end of the operation and the defeat of the enemy of the ceasefire agreement with the mediation of Russia, resulting in both the disbandment of the armed forces of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and Armenia itself (Sauer, 2023). After 30 years, the Azerbaijani jurisdiction returned to this territory marked a real tragedy for the local population. Ethnic Armenians began to leave the region en masse, and the number of refugees approached 100,000, most of whom are children, women, and the elderly (Demuryan, 2023). A real threat of blockade and even genocide of the Armenian population has been created and continues to remain, for example, representatives of the International Criminal Court called on the international community to help in avoiding ethnic cleansing and humanitarian catastrophe (Ocampo, 2023).

Such a sad and rapid development of events caused mass protests in the capital of Armenia - Yerevan, where some people accused the Russian Federation of inaction, while others accused the current Armenian authorities, especially Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan (“Armenia protesters demand PM resign after Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire”, 2023). At the same time, namely, Pashinyan was inactive during the Azerbaijani offensive in Karabakh, and before that, he pursued a policy of rapprochement with the West, which Moscow did not like. Moreover, Armenia which has been in the sphere of influence and interests of Russia since the collapse of the USSR after the September events began to ignore various military and economic Russia-dominated summits (Balasanyan, 2023). Of course, the events of this cause confusion about the future of Armenia's foreign and domestic policy. But it is quite possible to admit that, as a result, the Armenian side has lost this long conflict, which can lead both to an increase in anti-Russian policy and vice versa to a change of government to a more pro-Russian one.

As for Azerbaijan, it is likely to continue its existing policy, but the crushing successes of the government and the armed forces may inspire a more acute and large-scale confrontation with the Armenians. The Karabakh region itself will now face the process of Azerbaijanization and the gradual expulsion of the remaining residents of Armenian origin. For example, Azerbaijan may try to make a corridor from the autonomous region of Nakhichevan, an exclave cut off from Azerbaijan to the main part of the country, following the example of Vladimir Putin with a land corridor to the Crimean Peninsula. Debates over the connection of Nakhichevan and the rest of Azerbaijan are already

underway, including the active participation of friendly Turkey, and Armenia resists this, which makes the likelihood of new and even larger full-scale clashes quite real (Heinz, 2023). This corridor would be key to boosting regional trade, strengthening Azerbaijan's influence, and diminishing Armenia's territorial integrity. However, such an invasion would face strong international condemnation, potentially destabilizing the South Caucasus region. However, the international cost, including potential economic sanctions and diplomatic solutions, could outweigh the immediate benefits of such a bold move.



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## **THE TOPIC OF CANADIAN NEWS**

### **The Victory of Manitoba's New Premier: A Step Toward Indigenization, Empowerment, and Progressive Ideas in Canada**

**Written by Daniil Zhelezniak**



### **Introduction**

The election of the Prime Minister of Manitoba, which took place about a year ago, marked an important moment in the history of Canada, for the reason that for the first



time in the history of the province, a representative of Indigenous peoples, a candidate from the New Democratic Party of Manitoba - Wab Kinew, was chosen as the leader. Progress and positive trends in the indigenization of Canadian politics are a symbol of progress for the country's entire society since his victory reflects a broader shift toward empowerment and combating discrimination. All of this is crucial for our country, which has a long history of colonialism, discrimination and true genocide and is still struggling with this legacy and to change attitudes towards indigenous peoples. In this article, we would like to consider this new chapter on the path to reconciliation, when the voices of indigenous peoples are becoming increasingly important, especially in the political process. This article also will explore how the victory of Manitoba's new Premier could influence the indigenization of Canadian politics, as well as radical changes in empowerment issues, and inspire new progressive trends, drawing comparisons to similar movements across the globe.

## **Background of Indigenization in Canadian Politics**

The indigenization of politics refers to integrating Indigenous perspectives, values, and leadership into governance structures traditionally dominated by settler-colonial frameworks. First of all, the large representation of ethnic minorities in politics at different levels can mean a great desire and real actions to protect and develop such key factors as languages, traditions, beliefs, and culture in general. Thus, with an Indigenous population of 1,807,250 people across Canada (approximately 5% of population), including Metis and Inuit, according to the 2021 census, these nations remain

unfortunately underrepresented in political and criminal justice life, which greatly complicates and slows down progressive processes (“2021 Census of Canada Indigenous People”, 2023). Certainly, Kinew’s success, as a proud member of the Anishinaabe Nation, stands as a powerful symbol of this ongoing process (“Wab Kinew: A leader bridging Indigenous heritage and modern politics”, n.d.). It reflects the growing recognition that Indigenous peoples must play a leading role in shaping policies that affect their communities and the broader Canadian society.

Historically, Canada’s political landscape has been shaped without the meaningful inclusion of Indigenous voices. The Indian Act of 1876 imposed government control over First Nations' governance, lands, and cultural practices, severely limiting their political representation and autonomy, while residential schools and other policies aimed at assimilating Indigenous populations further marginalized and disempowered Indigenous peoples (“Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5.”, 1985). Even though the Canadian state has tried to take certain steps towards reconciliation the Act still enforces a paternalistic framework that restricts the autonomy of Indigenous peoples, contributing to ongoing social, economic, and legal inequalities.

Indigenization in politics will not only have an impact on culture but can include issues such as human rights in the Indigenous, infrastructure development, environmental stewardship, and socio-economic justice. For example, his advocacy for land-based education and traditional knowledge aligns with global trends where Indigenous knowledge systems are being recognized as vital for addressing modern challenges,

especially in areas like environmental protection and sustainable development. Also, we must remember that many of the inhabitants of Indigenous settlements, especially in remote areas, do not have access to basic services, including access to clean and safe water, which is almost the only such example in the so-called developed countries. Moreover, mining by corporations in different regions of Canada not only devastates the lands originally owned by the indigenous peoples of North America but also pollutes the environment both globally and in specific places of compact residence. For example, according to reports from one of the UN branches, many reservoirs that are used both for fishing by Indigenous peoples and as a source of water, including drinking water, are seriously polluted, while activists advocating for improving the quality of life are punished, including by law (“End of mission statement by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation, Canada”, 2024). The real progress can be expected only if the representation of Indigenous peoples increases, which will break the vicious circle of systemic discrimination. For example, by promoting legislative changes that recognize the power of Indigenous peoples over water supply, water resources beyond their reservations, at least on which they depend, or guaranteeing investments for the development of environmentally friendly energy sources and infrastructure will help reduce inequality. The integration of these perspectives into mainstream politics would not only benefit Indigenous communities but also offer innovative solutions to broader societal challenges.

## **Indigenization prospects**

One of the most radical, but extremely innovative and effective tools to provide Indigenous peoples with a direct voice in Canadian democracy, which would include their specific issues at the forefront of national discussion, is the creation of an Indigenous political party in Canada. After all, the major parties in the Canadian parliament often view First Nations issues as part of broader platforms, but these issues are often sidelined or blurred in favor of more general election promises. Whereas an Indigenous political party would focus exclusively on bridging the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians including new immigrants by creating a platform for dialogue, Indigenous issues such as land rights, economic empowerment, and cultural preservation.

## **The probability of Indigenization**

Before exploring the potential for an Indigenous party in Canada, it's important to understand the prerequisites for such a political organization and compare the situation in our country with other countries with similar history, political, and demographic situations. We will analyze the New Zealand example, where the creation of the Māori Party (Te Pāti Māori) was prompted by certain incidents that inspired local Indigenous communities, such as the controversial Foreshore and Seabed Act of 2004, which sought to limit Māori customary land rights (Paewai, 2024). The key factor in creating the Māori Party was the existence of a political audience where a particular part of the population was ignored or/and inadequately represented by the mainstream parties, which excluded them from significant political decision-making in New Zealand ("About us", n.d.). It is obvious that the situation in Canada is no better than that, however, it has almost 2

million representatives of the First Nations in Canada, which, although less in proportion to the population (approximately 5% in Canada and 17% in NZ), but is more in numbers (“2018 Census totals by topic - national highlights”, 2019).

One prerequisite for creating a successful Indigenous party in Canada would be a collective sense of unifying, while Indigenous peoples in Canada share certain grievances—such as the legacy of residential schools, land disputes, and socio-economic inequality—the diversity of Indigenous cultures, languages, and interests could be an obstacle to a cohesive political movement. Another essential prerequisite is political organization and leadership. Leaders such as Wab Kinew, who recently made the history of progressive trends, could provide the necessary political and symbolic leadership to unite Indigenous voices under a common cause, and with a common goal.

An important framework supporting Indigenous rights in Canada is the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which was recognized and adopted by Canada in 2016, UNDRIP recognizes (“Canadian governments and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, 2024). The creation of an Indigenous political party would be consistent with the principles outlined in UNDRIP, providing a platform to advocate for Indigenous autonomy, participation in governance, rights to self-determination, land rights, and cultural practices. Federal or provincial parties with such structure and ideology could push for greater legislative action to fully implement UNDRIP’s provisions into Canadian law, ensuring that

Indigenous peoples have a direct representation in political processes and that their rights and freedoms are de-facto protected, not only de-jure.

## **Challenges**

While the creation of an Indigenous party has many potential advantages, there are also significant challenges that must be considered. In terms of electoral power, the Aboriginal population of only 5% may seem like a small base from which to draw, especially given Canada's first-past-the-post electoral system, which tends to favor larger, established parties. However, the strength of such a party would not necessarily lie in securing a majority of parliamentary seats, but in wielding influence as a minority or coalition party, focusing on current First Nations issues in more detail, for example, as the Bloc Quebecois is now defending the rights of the Francophone population. The Māori Party of New Zealand faced similar problems as a minority party, but this state of affairs forced other parties to compromise, including taking into account the importance of coalitions in multiparty parliamentary systems. In particular, such coalitions in New Zealand have achieved significant success in the language field since in certain sectors, especially in government, education, and military, knowledge of the Māori language is becoming increasingly in demand, and sometimes mandatory (Mercer, 2019). But undoubtedly, such an electoral barrier could limit the effectiveness of an Indigenous party in particular at the federal level unless Canada would shift to a more proportional representation system, which would allow such a party to gain seats proportional to its share of the national vote.

Another crucial obstacle is the political diversity within Indigenous communities themselves. Indigenous peoples in Canada are not a monolithic group, like in New Zealand, and their political priorities can vary significantly based on region, culture, traditions, languages, and local circumstances. Thus, there are 634 First Nation communities across Canada, 50 different nations with different traditions, and 50 different unique languages (“Annual Report to Parliament 2020”, 2020). Building a cohesive national platform that addresses these diverse needs would be a complex task.

Moreover, building a political party requires significant financial resources, organizational structure, and grassroots mobilization. Many Indigenous communities are already burdened by economic and social challenges that would require considerable coordination and external support, which can impact negatively the sovereignty in decision-making.

## **Conclusion**

Enhancing Indigenous political representation and furthering their rights inside the political system are two major benefits of the proposed Indigenous political party for Canada, which would be developed after the Māori Party of New Zealand. A party like this might provide a focused platform for addressing challenges unique to Indigenous people, promoting self-determination, and pushing for the full application of the UNDRIP's principles. Wab Kinew's election as the first Indigenous premier of Manitoba may serve as an important boost for the emergence of an Indigenous political movement on a national scale. His triumph suggests that Indigenous leadership is becoming more

widely accepted in Canadian politics, which could encourage similar movements across the nation. However, when creating such a party, you need to take into account not only a huge list of advantages but also all the difficulties and challenges including the diversity within Indigenous communities, the limitations of Canada's first-past-the-post electoral system, and the financial and organizational resources required to launch a new political force. Despite these difficulties, the increasing support for Indigenous rights and political empowerment, along with initiatives such as UNDRIP, can provide a conducive environment for such progress. In the future of Canadian politics, Indigenous voices and leadership are should play a larger role, either through the creation of a specific Indigenous party or through greater involvement in existing mainstream parties, what is a critically important step towards interethnic reconciliation.



## **TOPIC OF RELEVANT AND BREAKING NEWS**

### **Diverse demographics of the U.S. Elections in the swing states**

**Written by Daniil Zhelezniak**

The proximity of the presidential elections in the United States of America in 2024 makes many people take a closer interest in aspects that may affect the results of the vote. One of these factors in any election is demography. Understanding the demographic trends and socio-political views of numerous population groups related to past U.S. elections (2020) provides important information about the 2024 election, especially in the so-called swing states where small changes in voter behavior can determine the outcome. On the other hand, if you are reading this article after the 2024 elections, it will be interesting for you to compare my analysis with the real situation.

**Below, I have provided an analysis of each battleground state by unpredictability of voting and the importance of influencing elections in general in descending order:**

**PENNSYLVANIA:** this state played a key role in the 2020 elections as a large swing state (20 electoral votes), where completely different ethnic groups are represented among urban, suburban and rural voters, making the region one of the most interesting and unpredictable. Despite Joe Biden's victory in 2020 and the presence of a large number of extremely urbanized and industrial places, the state remains deeply divided, where the chances of candidates in 2024 are about 50/50. But the most interesting fact about the state of Pennsylvania from the point of view of demography is that due to the

presence of a large number of people of Eastern European origin, the foreign policy programs of both presidential candidates are viewed through the prism of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Residents of this state with Russian, Ukrainian, Czech, Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, Baltic and most importantly Polish backgrounds (7.2% of the state population) are very concerned about the fate of historical homelands and the approach of the United States to ensuring the security of these countries, for example, through NATO (“American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates”, 2008). On the one hand, these population groups may be very concerned about outright threats, along with populist slogans and isolationist statements by Donald Trump, at the same time, Eastern Europeans remain faithful to traditions and conservatism (Sciutto, 2024). This kind of situation creates equal chances for the two American parties

**MICHIGAN:** The political landscape of this region bordering Canada changed 4 years ago, when the state returned to the Democratic side after the unexpected victory of the Republicans in 2016. The largest city, Detroit, which is home to a significant number of African Americans (up to 80%), played a decisive role in this result, as almost the entire city voted for the blues (Warikoo, 2020). In addition, suburban areas that previously often supported the Republicans have shown more balanced vote. The Detroit Combined statistical area will continue to play an important role as it accounts for more than half of Michigan's population (“Detroit-Warren-Ann Arbor, MI CSA profile”, n.d.). By analogy with Pennsylvania, the views of Michigan's ethnic minorities are also impacted by foreign military conflicts and the approaches of the two parties to foreign policy. There is

also a significant Polish and Ukrainian diaspora in the state, for whom NATO's policy in Eastern Europe is important. But the Middle Eastern community of about 300,000 people from the state's population, primarily of Arab origin, making up the majority in some areas, will have a special impact due to recent events in Gaza and Lebanon (Warikoo, 2024). Dissatisfaction with US policy regarding Israel's aggressive actions in the Middle East has significantly undermined the confidence of Arab Americans in the Democratic Party, which will undoubtedly affect the elections on November 5, for example, in a lower turnout.

**NORTH CAROLINA:** Although North Carolina remains a swing state with a diverse population, it remained slightly Republican leaning based on the past 3 electoral cycles. But the good news for Democrats here is the fact that urban centers such as Charlotte and Raleigh-Durham saw higher turnout of more liberal young voters in 2020, as well as interstate migration of young generations and racialized groups playing an increasingly distinct role (Routley, 2024). In 2024, the chances of winning the election and getting as many as 16 electoral votes in North Carolina look pretty equal between Harris and Trump, which gives the potential for sensationalism. It is also quite obvious that the Republican Party more likely to perform worse than in the previous two elections and almost guaranteed may become a blue state in the next electoral cycle (in 2028) in accordance with current trends (“HPU Poll: North Carolina presidential race remains close”, 2024).

**GEORGIA:** This swing state has played and is playing a key role in the political life of the country because it gives 16 votes to the Electoral College, which is very significant in the current realities and system. In the 2020 elections, for the first time since 1992, the Democratic Party won in this region, where the margin was only more than 10,000 votes, many of which became possible thanks to the votes of African Americans historically lean to the Democratic Party (Gordon, John & Marsh, 2024). The Black population of Georgia is about a third, which makes it the fourth US state in terms of the proportion of this racial group (31%), which gives the Democrats, led by Kamala Harris, an advantage in the global strategy (“Race and ethnicity in the United States: 2010 and 2020 Census”, 2021). However, given this small margin 4 years ago and the fact that both parties try to rely on voters from less diverse suburbs, makes the US Republican Party the favorite in the battle for “the State of Adventure”.

**ARIZONA & NEVADA:** Arizona's shift to a swing state has been marked by the significant participation of Latino voters, who are playing an increasingly significant role, by making up a third of the 7 million population of the state (Archer, 2023). As in Georgia, in Arizona, the margin in favor of Joseph Biden was only about 10,000 votes, including thanks to racial minority groups living in urban areas like Phoenix or Tucson. Traditionally considered in the past to be supporters of progressive and liberal ideas, Hispanics are increasingly shifting towards right-wing ideologies, which was seen in the Southern states both in the 2016 and 2020 elections and may play a key role in 2024 (Martinez, 2024). The neighboring state of Nevada, which has less weight in the electoral

college system (11 electoral votes in AZ vs. 6 in NV), has the same trends as in Arizona, where Latin Americans and young voters play a key role in influencing election results. However, the significant level of urbanization in Nevada (one of the highest in the United States), thanks to metropolitan areas such as Las Vegas and Reno, creates much more favorable conditions for the Democratic Party in comparison with Arizona (“2010 Census of Population and Housing: Arizona (CPH-2-30)”, 2012, p. 9).

**WISCONSIN:** In 2020, this northern state became another key battleground where both parties had a chance of getting 10 electoral votes. A state where ethnic minorities make up only about 20% has defected to the Democrats by a small margin, primarily because of urban centers like Milwaukee and Madison. Kamala Harris's strategy of improving her position can be considered an attempt to improve the turnout among racial minorities and young Americans (Felton, 2024). While conservatives are trying to improve results among white voters from rural and suburban areas who have been affected by economic problems. In the run-up to the elections, the situation is such that the Democratic Party is likely to win in Wisconsin (“2024 presidential election polls: Wisconsin”, 2024).

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